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JOHN STUART MILL 
On Liberty 
ROBERT M. MacIVER • BERTRAND RUSSELL • LYMAN BRYSON 
Bryson: One of the men whose works were on grandfather's 
bookshelf, where they were regarded with reverence-and, I sup-
pose, occasionally read-was undoubtedly John Stuart Mill. And if 
grandfather were happy enough to have any liberalism, he probably 
based it on Mill. Mill has become a symbol for hard logic and think-
ing rather vigorously. I'm not sure that symbol is a valid one, except 
for one curious bright line of romance in his life-I'm not sure there's 
any humanity left in the man, but he must have been human once. 
Russell : Oh, Mill was extremely human. In fact, his logic was 
constantly suffering. Mill was a great friend of both my parents. 
My father was a disciple of his ; and he used to come to stay with 
them. For instance, he would read Shelley's Ode to Liberty aloud. 
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Bryson : He read it well, Mr. Russell? 
Russell: He read it with too much emotion, and he'd shoot back-
wards and forwards while he was reading it. Finally, one tim~, he 
said, "It is almost too beautiful. I can read no more." He had im-
mense emotion about it. 
Maciver: Do you know a rhyme about John Stuart Mill, which 
brings out that point ? Itgoes as follows : 
John Stuart Mill, 
By an effort of wil, 
Overcam~his . 
Natural bonhomie, 
And wrote The Principles of 
Political Economy. 
Russell: Yes, that's a very good rhyme. 
Bryson: Well, I should think the problem would be, Mr. Mac-
Iver, to decide whether or not he ever actually did overcome his 
"bon-homie," his almost sentimental nature, which appears to have 
been underneath this rigorous exterior. You suggested, Mr. Russell, 
that he was not quite such a rigorous logician as he had the re-
putation of being. 
Russell: No, I think he wasn't. The pretense of rigorous logic 
was due to his fear of his father. His father was a rigorous man 
and tried to bring up his son to be just the same sort of person. 
But in John the heart was always rebelling against the head. This 
began when he was an adolescent, and it went right on. 
Bryson : But he did write a book on logic. 
Russell: Oh, yes, but it isn't any good. 
Bryson : Well, what about his book On Liberty ? Is that eny 
good? 
Maclver: Oh, that was a very important book, not only when 
it was written, in 1859, but, at this very day, it's one of the most 
significant books in the field. 
Bryson: You mean, Mr. Maciver, it's significant because it says 
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things which are stil true? 
Maciver: It is. A great many things that Mill said could not 
be said better today. They are equally true today and always will 
be, in my judgment. 
Bryson : Before we try to decide whether or not he arrived at 
these things on sound grounds, which may not make so much differ-
ence in the case of an advocate or a politician or statesman as it 
might in that of a philosopher, let's get at what he actually did say. 
What did he believe about liberty ? Itwas a good thing, no doubt. 
But how far did he go ? 
Maciver: Well, Mill was not so much concerned with the in-
terference of government by itself ; but he thought in terms of our 
democratic system of things. He was about the first who thought 
that way in many affairs. So he's terribly afraid of the majority, 
not merely of a government. He's afraid of the censorship of the 
whole of the. group over the individual. 
Bryson : The main danger was that the majority of the people 
would keep down individuality. 
Maciver: He thinks that the majority are adverse, when they 
get together that way, t~individuality. And he says in this book, 
as his starting point, that everybody lives today under a hostile and 
dreaded censorship_. 
Bryson: This was about~he time when people began to cease 
to fear government primarily as the enemr of liberty and began to 
fear their neighbors. ・ 
Russell: Well, I suppose that change was beginning then. . The 
government was no longer the enemy that every decent person had 
to attack; it was no longer considered evil in itself. And then people 
like Mill woke up to the fact that, even so, it might have its evils, 
might have its dangers—which was a rather new idea to liberal-
minded people. 
Bryson: But the point that he raises, Mr. Maclver, in saying 
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that the majority would interfere with freedom, is whether there is 
no limit upon what individuality is allowed to do. I mean, can one 
do as he pleases? After al, Mill didn't believe in simple anarchy. 
Russell: Oh, no. But he thought he could draw a clear line 
between the things that belonged to an individual and the things 
that belonged to a society. That's what he does in the first part of 
this book. He says he is going to lay down a clear principle : al 
things that belong to the individual should be sacred to him, and 
there should be no interference; al things that belong to society, 
society can make proper provision for. 
Bryson: It sounds good. 
Maclver: It sounds good if you can follow it up. 
Russell : Well, the principle would be sound if it had any prac-
tical consequences. But the practical consequences that he reaches, 
he arrives at by fallacious reasoning, and because he meant to arrive 
at just those consequences. 
Bryson: He had set them up, Mr. Russell, before he started to 
write? 
Russell: Yes. His heart was governing his head, as always. I 
think myself that his conclusions are sound, and his principle is 
sound ; but the conclusions do not follow from the principles. 
Maclver: If, Mr. Russell, by'conclusions'you mean his appli-
cations, I would not wholly~gree. Some of his applications were a 
bit dubious. For example, there's this case of the sale of poisons. He 
admits freely that poisons can be used for murder, but he says, 
"Well, they're also used for perfectly useful purposes, so we must 
not interfere with their sale." 
Bryson: But, Mr. Maciver, he does say that one should register 
his name when he buys a poison so that, if there's any temptation 
afterward to use it on human rats instead of four-legged ones, you 
can get caught at it. He does say that, doesn't he ? 
Maclver: He certainly does. 
MILL, On Liberty 670 
Bryson : But that's the only restriction he makes. You think he 
should have made more ? 
Maciver: I think there's certain danger if you don't make more 
in this particular case. There's the risk of damage, and he says that 
where there's a risk of damage there is a case for control. 
Russell: Yes, I'm inclined to agree with you about poisons. And 
there, I don't think it follows from his own principle, because there's 
risk; and he says that where there;s risk of damage to other people, 
you have a right to interfere. 
Bryson : What about the case of the bridge-the unsafe bridge? 
He says, if there's a sign upon a bridge saying, "This bridge is not 
safe," and you see somebody, who is presumably in his right mind, 
walking out on it, you should keep stil and do nothing. 
Russell: I should certainly agree with that. If a man wants to 
walk over a bridge knowing that it's unsafe, let him do so. I can't 
see by what right you should stop the man if he wants to. 
Bryson : Then you wouldn't interfere with a suicide. 
Russell: ・I certainly should not. No. 
Maciver : Now I'm not going to go against that, because I ag~ee 
with you. At the same time, there is a principle that's involved. 
You say, I don't think in the one case it should be done-I think, 
in:the other case, there should be control. That's in. the case of 
poison, not in the case of the unsafe bridge. But that's because your 
own particular discretion says here there is a risk of damage enough 
to support action, and here there isn't. 
Bryson: That's the other side of the line, isn't it, Mr. Maciver? 
It is damage to others rather than damage to one's self. 
Maciver: But it's a matter of who ass邸seswhether there is 
damage or nQt. There's the rub. 
Russell: As a matter of course if there were a lot of people 
under the bridge who would be killed if it fel, then I should certain-
ly stop the man from walking over the unsafe bridge. 
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Bryson : But that's not his case, Mr. Russell. His point is that 
you don't interfere to keep the man from grave risk of killing or 
hurting himself, for his own sake. Well, is it possible to redraw the 
principle? Mr. Maciver says that there is no clear field where it 
affects only the one person, and no clear field where it affects only 
society at large. In the first case you don't interfere no matter if 
the person is going to damage himself, in the second you do if there 
is going to be damage to others. Now, you say that line can't be 
drawn. Can that principle be restated so that it's sounder? 
Russell: Yes, I think you can restate in this way: that any 
prohibition must be justified not on the ground of preserving the 
man himself from harm, but of preserving other people from harm. 
That is the only justification for prohibitions. Of course, it's often 
very difficult to draw the line, but that is a characteristic of al 
decision. There's nothing peculiar in that. 
Bryson : You think that it's impossible to make these things 
rigid in any case ? 
Russell: You can't make anything rigid. In every imaginable 
thing, there's a margin of doubt. There is always a marginal case 
of which you can't say whether it belongs on this side or on that. 
That is always so. 
Maciver: Of course, Mill himself admits that very principle, 
Mr. Russell. ・ 
Russell: Yes. 
Maciver : At the very beginning of his essay he says: "The 
only reason for which mankind is justified to interfere with the 
liberty of any man is self-protection"—that is, the protection of 
society, never to save the man from himself. Now you can accept 
that principle but—in Mill's treatment there was always a tendency 
to think of man as being rather insulated in his relation to society. 
Bryson: Not only that, Mr. Maciver, wasn't there also in Mill's 
case a failure to be a prophet (as might be expected) and realize 
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the extent to which the danger that one is subject to in ordinary 
living would be vastly increased by technological changes? All kinds 
of things are dangerous now that didn't exist in Mill's time. L砒
me add a case which he might have used if he had been writing 
in this year-letting a person drive an automobile when he's drunk 
Russell: Well, that is quite clear-you mustn't let a man drive 
an automobile when he's drunk. But you shouldn't interfere with 
his getting drunk in his own home if he wants to, because that's 
his own afair. 
Bryson : But then one gets into this very. wide band of uncer-
tainty, Mr. Russell, when he realizes that there are many people 
who aren't very good drivers when they're sober, and it's very 
difficult to tel whether they're going to have an accident in advance. 
Russell: Oh, Yes. You have a perfect right, before you give 
a man a license to drive, to make out that he can drive, and that 
surely is done. 
Bryson : It's done, yes. But we stil kil forty or fifty thousand 
people a year on the highways. 
Maciver: You know, I'm stil afraid that, if we accept the prin-
ciple that• anything can be interfered with if there's a risk of 
damage, we might get into situations that many of us would dislike. 
Bryson: Put it in another field, Mr. Maciver. ~n the second・ 
half of his book, Mill more or less makes a jump and goes into the 
risk that there is in saying something which may not be true. How 
about dangerous thoughts? 
Maciver: Ah, but there is a very different argument there, and, 
I think, a much better one. In that part Mill is giving substantial 
grounds for men being free to think as they please, to have their 
own opinions and their own creeds on everything. And he does 
that in terms of a distinction of what makes truth, and how truth 
is advancing_ society. Where do we learn things? How do we learn? 
If you censor, you're preventing truth from expressing itself. Even, 
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he says-and I think this is a very important statement—even truth 
itself, if it is controlled by authority and by coercion, becomes 
superstition. 
Russell: I agree entirely with that. And I think it's very im-
portant to realize that the arguments for free speech and free 
thought do not depend upon this principle of Mill's-because what 
you think and what you say does affect others and yourself and, 
therefore, would be ruled out from the sphere of liberty if one took 
his principle as the sole basis for liberty. 
Bryson : His first principle doesn't run in the second area. Well, 
let me approach it in another way. One hears now, in the rather 
excited state of American public opinion-and it may be true in 
your country also, Lord Russell-that a person should not be allowed 
to sp蛾klies, that lies are a damage to society and nobody should 
be allowed to sreak lies. Now Mill would say that anybody should 
be allowed to say whatever he thinks he wants to say. He doesn't 
even discuss good faith. 
Russell: I think you may perhaps maintain that everybody 
should be allowed to say what he likes but, if so, you should supple-
ment it by saying that, when it's damaging to some individual, that 
individual must have a right to equal publicity in reply. 
Bryson : Yes. That begins to divide our field into two kinds of 
dangerous thoughts, doesn't it? When you say something which is 
not true about a person and is damaging to the person, that requires 
some kind of rebuttal for the person. 
Russell: Yes. 
Bryson: But suppose somebody should get up in your country, 
or in this one, and say he believes that the kind of government we 
have is a bad government, we ought to have another. In the present 
temper of society, that person would be drastically interfered with. 
Mill would object, wouldn't he? 
Russell: Yes. He would object to it very profoundly. I think 
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everybody should have the right at any moment to argue that the 
government of his own country might be improved. And if you 
don't say that, _it means that you impose upon ym.ir country what-
ever evils your government happens to have at the moment. 
Maciver: I am heartily in accord with that. I'd say that, not 
only should you be able to say, if yo~want to, that the government 
could be improved; you should be able to say that the government 
is rotten through and through, and nobody ought to interfere with 
you. 
Bryson : Even that we should have another kind of government? 
Maciver: Altogether. You can say al that, and I'l think you're 
stil within the reasonable bounds of liberty. 
Bryson : But Mill didn't assert that only on the basis of his 
first principle, which you two gentlemen are inclined to question. 
He gives other reasons for saying that one should not suppress any 
opinion. And they're pretty good reasons. 
Maciver: He gives what I think are really substantial reasons, 
which have litle to do with any particular logical system at al. 
He thinks about the whole creativeness of men-the things that 
make men spontaneous, the things 01:1t of which growth occurs— 
and he says, if you cut down these freedoms in the area of thought 
and discussion, you are curbing al that makes for newness in life, 
and for vigor, for freshness in society. 
Russell: All that I quite agree with. But, of course, a new 
thing has arisen since Mill's time-one which he didn't consider at 
al. That is the fact that an opinion held by the rich and powerful 
has a much better chance of succeeding as propaganda than one 
which is held by the poor and powerless. Therefore, if you have 
free competition among opinions, it is not the excellence of the 
opinion that gives it victory but the power of those who hold it. 
Maciver: I agree that there is always a certain handicap on 
the part of the weak against the strong. But isn't it remarkable 
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that so many times the opinion held by the weak has triumphed 
over the opinion of the strong. Isn't that true even in this matter 
of politics or government, as well as in other affairs? 
Russell: Well, I think that's true only where the government 
has been rather incompetent. But if you have a strong, competent 
government, it can pretty well make sure of having its opinions 
adopted. 
Maciver: I don't quite agree. I'm thinking how often I've 
known cases where elections went against a party that had al the 
powerful organs and in favor of a party that had very less influ-
ential periodicals and newspapers on its side. 
Russell: That is quite true. 
Maciver: In this country and in others that has happened. 
Bryson: Of course, that can happen. Nevertheless, the danger 
to the creativeness of freedom, which Mr. Russell speaks of, is stil 
there. 
Maciver: Oh, I admit the danger. But I do not see any way of 
dealing with it. And I say it is a danger that is limited because 
somehow or other-it's curious how-an opinion carries weight if 
it appeals to people. And they'll get to know it in~ime unless, of 
course, they are living under a monopoly in a dictatorship. 
Bryson : When you look at Mill's arguments, when he says that 
the new opinion, which is being suppressed, may be true, and it 
would be a pity to suppres3 the truth, .I think most people who are 
uneasy now about free speech would agree. But, when he comes to 
his second point and says that one's own possession of the truth is 
far stronger if he has been compelled to defend it against error, a 
lot of people now would say that is not !O. I'm not one of those 
people-don't misunderstand me, I agree with Mill. But a lot of 
people would say : "That isn't true ; there are many weak people, 
there are many people who are easily confused; and, if you permit 
lies to fly abroad in the world, these people are going to be taken 
10 
MILL, On Liberty 66ム
in, and pretty soon you will have a situation you can't deal with." 
Now Mil~would say that's a risk we have to run, wouldn't he? 
Maciver: Oh yes! I don't -believe he'd take such a risk very 
seriously at any time. 
Bryson : He'd think it wouldn't be much ?f a risk? . 
Maciver: I don't think he'd consider it much of a risk at al. 
Bryson : But isn't most of the suppression of free speech at the 
present time based upon that kind of argument ? 
Russell: It is, and, I think, entirely wrongly. Take education 
for instance. Most educational authorities hold that there are certain 
opinions that their pupils must not be allowed to hear. 
Bryson: Not to hear at al. 
Russell: Not to hear at al. Because they think their pupils are 
grossly stupid. They think the advocates of what they consider 
error are extremely clever, and that, if the pupils hear these advo-
cates of error, they will be convinced of error. That is a position 
of dogmatism which I think is utterly intolerable. 
Bryson : You sound almost like Mill himself, Mr. Russell. Here 
is one statement out of Mill, which is typical of Mill's way of 
thinking, but I wonder if it isn't a litle optimistic, in the light of 
some things that are happening. Mill says: "If civilization has got 
the better of barbarism when barbarism had the world to itself, 
it is too much to profess to be afraid lest barbarism, after having 
been fairly got under, should revive and conquer civilization. A 
civilization that can thus succumb to its vanquished enemy must 
first to become so degenerate that neither its appointed priests and 
teachers, nor anybody else who has the capacity, will take the 
trouble to . stand up for it. If this be so, the sooner it receives 
notice to quit, the better." That sounds to me a bit over-confident 
about what civilization can do. After al, civilizations have gone 
down. 
Russell: Yes. What is, I think, so very much over-confidence is 
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the idea that barbarism has been vanquished. After al, even in 
the most civilized contries there are a great many barbarians, and 
very often they get hold of the government. 
Maciver: Of course he says it's only when what he calls civi-
lization becomes degel].erated that that happens. If you take that 
with a certain latitude, perhaps he wasn't quite so optimistic after 
al. 
Bryson : But isn't civilization always a battle inside a nation as 
well as between nations? You have to fight for civilization wher-
ever you find it in danger. But Mill's optimism appears, even from 
your point of view, Mr. Russell, a bit over-confident, a bit excessive. 
What was there in Mill's character that made him grasp with so 
much fervor and state with so much eloquence ideas which have 
lasted for a hundred years-even though he couldn't arrive at 
them~Y logic. 
Russell: Well, I think they were the ideas that our time needs; 
but our time doesn't desire them as much as his time did. I think 
they're stil needed and stil very good. 
Maciver: When he spoke about civilizations be.coming degen-
erate, I think he felt that one way to prevent degeneration was 
simply this way of allowing al opinions free scope. In this arena 
of opinion you have fresh air that, more than anything else, can 
keep civilization from degenerating, because it degenaertes in the 
mind not in the body. 
Russell: Yes. Here again he was too optimistic. He thought 
that discussion would lead people to the more reasonable opinion. I 
think that, with the development of modern propaganda methods, 
this is no longer true. 
Bryson : You mean it's no longer true, unless discussion can 
be made to persist in spite of propaganda. 
Russell: Oh, yes. 
Bryson : It's stil possible, isn't it? 
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Russell: It's possible-but only if you control propaganda in 
ways which, I think, his own principles of liberty would make im-
possible. 
Bryson: So you think that we have developed a situation in 
which, although his principles are sound, they'd be extraordinarily 
difficult to realize. 
Russell: Very dificult, considering the power of modern propa-
ganda, yes. 
Maciver: I'm not so afraid of propaganda where everybody's 
free and where there's no suppression of anyone's opinion. I'd be 
willing to take a chance there. 
Bryson: You really are pretty well convinced that Mill had 
the right idea ? 
Maciver: Oh, definitely. 
Bryson : Even though you don't think his arguments will al 
stand up? Well, I find in reading the book that what gave me 
almost a feeling of inspiration was the eloquence ahd force of his 
statement of the value of difference, the value to civilization of 
spontaneity and freedom, the value of the creative power that lies 
in difference and the chance for very man to be himself. That is 
there, even though the arguments may not stand up. 
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